Attorney Michael Rehm - (800) 978-0754

Attorney Michael Rehm represents people injured or killed in aviation accidents throughout California — crashes involving commercial airlines, charter flights, private aircraft, helicopters, and air ambulances. Cases are handled on a contingency fee basis from Sacramento. No fee without a recovery.

Aviation accident law is not standard California negligence. The governing framework shifts depending on what type of aircraft was involved, who operated it, whether the flight was domestic or international, how old the aircraft and its parts are, and whether a federal agency's air traffic controllers contributed to the crash. This page covers the complete legal framework governing aviation accident claims in California. City-specific and airport-specific pages branch from here.

The California Statutory Foundation

California's State Aeronautics Act, codified at Public Utilities Code sections 21001 through 21709, was enacted to further and protect the public interest in aeronautics. The Act defines aeronautics broadly: transportation by aircraft; the operation, construction, repair, or maintenance of aircraft, aircraft power plants, and accessories; and the design, establishment, construction, extension, operation, improvement, repair, or maintenance of airports and other air navigation facilities. Pub. Util. Code § 21011. In the absence of statutory regulation, aviation law is an application of familiar common-law principles to a relatively recent field. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 668.

Two provisions of the State Aeronautics Act establish the basic tort liability framework. Public Utilities Code section 21404 provides that the liability of the owner or pilot of an aircraft carrying passengers for injury or death to those passengers is determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land arising out of similar relationships. Public Utilities Code section 21405 applies the same principle to aircraft collisions — whether the collision occurs on land or in the air, liability is governed by California tort law.

Public Utilities Code section 21401 confirms that sovereignty over the airspace above California rests in the state, except where granted to and assumed by the United States. The federal government's authority is limited to what it may exercise through its constitutional powers — principally the commerce clause and the power to provide for national defense. Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu (9th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3d 1109. This concurrent sovereignty structure is what makes aviation law a federal-state regime rather than exclusively one or the other.

Standard of Care: Commercial Carrier vs. Private Operation

The duty of care an aircraft operator owes depends on whether it is a common carrier or a private carrier. The distinction determines the standard of negligence that applies and who carries the burden of proof.

Common Carriers: Utmost Care

A carrier of persons for reward is required by statute to use the utmost care and diligence for the safe carriage of passengers, to provide everything necessary for that purpose, and to exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill. Civil Code § 2100. The carrier must also provide vehicles that are safe and fit for the purposes to which they are put — and is not excused for a default in that obligation by any degree of care. Civil Code § 2101.

The utmost care standard is demanding. It requires the carrier to take whatever precautions are necessary or available to guard against the reasonably foreseeable dangerous consequences of its operations, whether those consequences arise from mechanical failure, human failure, or meteorological conditions. Powell v. Dell-Air Aviation, Inc. (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 451. Air carriers are responsible for any, even the slightest, negligence and are required to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under all the circumstances. Orr v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1467; Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 709.

The carrier does not guarantee absolute safety. A carrier is not liable for injuries that result from unforeseen natural causes — such as severe and genuinely unforeseeable air turbulence — rather than from any defect in the aircraft or negligence of the pilot or airport operators. Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1193; Gradus v. Hanson Aviation, Inc. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1038. A pilot forced to respond to a sudden emergency may not be considered negligent even if the pilot has made errors of judgment. Johnson v. Western Air Exp. Corp. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 614. The common carrier duty applies to nonpaying passengers as well as paying ones. Smith v. O'Donnell (1932) 215 Cal. 714. Whether a person is a passenger or a guest — and which standard applies — is a question of fact for the jury. Smith v. O'Donnell; Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 737.

When the Duty Ends

The utmost care standard applies while passengers are in transit and until they have safely departed the aircraft. It ends when the passenger reaches a place outside the sphere of any activity of the carrier that might reasonably constitute a mobile or animated hazard. Orr v. Pacific Southwest Airlines. The standard applies in the carrier's landing area — Marshall v. United Airlines (1st Dist. 1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 84 — but does not extend to an airport security checkpoint located outside the carrier's exclusive control. Orr. Once a passenger exits that zone, ordinary premises liability rules apply. No duty is imposed on businesses serving travelers to safeguard them from tripping on another passenger's luggage in a busy airport concourse.

Reliance on air traffic controllers does not relieve a common carrier of its duty. The involvement of another aircraft not under the carrier's control does not relieve it of liability, and reliance on the assistance of air traffic controllers provides no defense. Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines.

Private Carriers: Reasonable Care

The utmost care standard does not apply to private carriers. A private carrier — one not operating for reward as a common carrier — is held only to the standard of reasonable care. Gornstein v. Priver (1923) 64 Cal.App. 249. General aviation flights under FAA Part 91 are private carrier operations in most circumstances. The standard is ordinary negligence.

Pilot Duty of Care

In airplane tort cases governed by California law, the standard of due care is concurrent — resting on both the pilot and ground aviation personnel. But ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of an aircraft rests with the pilot in command. The pilot is the final authority as to the aircraft's operation, and a pilot's judgment supersedes air traffic control instructions when a conflict with safety arises. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States (9th Cir. 1995) 51 F.3d 834; Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 709; Management Activities, Inc. v. United States (C.D. Cal. 1998) 21 F.Supp.2d 1157.

Before beginning a flight, the pilot in command must familiarize himself or herself with all available information concerning that flight — including weather reports, fuel requirements, terrain, and runway lengths at intended destinations. McDaniel v. United States (N.D. Cal. 1982) 553 F.Supp. 910; 14 CFR § 91.103. Failure to obtain or act on preflight information is actionable negligence.

Liability extends to ground operations. A pilot who operates negligently while taxiing on a runway is liable for resulting injuries. Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp. (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 102; Robart v. Brehmer (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 830. In clear weather, pilots — not air traffic controllers — bear primary responsibility to visualize and avoid hazards such as wake turbulence. Management Activities, Inc. v. United States.

Aircraft Owner and Operator Liability

Public Utilities Code section 21404 makes an aircraft owner liable for death or injury resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the aircraft by any person using or operating it with the owner's express or implied permission. If the owner expressly or impliedly entrusts the aircraft to someone who then gives permission to a third person to use it, the owner remains liable for that third person's wrongful acts or omissions. White v. Inbound Aviation (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 910; Cummins v. Sky Cruisers, Inc. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 983.

Public Utilities Code section 21404.1 imposes a cap on vicarious liability where the relationship between the owner and the operator is not one of principal-agent or employer-employee. The cap does not apply to the owner's own conduct, and the owner is not immune from punitive damages imposed as punishment for the owner's own wrongful conduct.

Separate from vicarious liability, an aircraft owner who permits a person to operate the aircraft when the owner knows or should know that the person is incompetent or unqualified faces negligent entrustment liability under standard negligence principles. The section 21404.1 cap does not apply to a negligent entrustment theory — that theory runs on the owner's own negligence in the permitting decision, not the operator's negligence in flying.

For purposes of imposing vicarious liability, California law — not the contents of the federal aircraft registry — determines the identity of the aircraft owner. White v. Inbound Aviation.

Airport Operator Duty of Care

The duties and liabilities of an airport proprietor are governed by the general rules applicable to the operation and management of similar facilities open to the public. The airport operator must ensure the airport is safe for aircraft and other invitees, give warning of any danger of which the operator knows or ought to know, and is liable to a person injured by a violation of that duty. The operator has a specific duty to keep runways and areas of invited use free from obstructions as far as possible, and to warn pilots by suitable means of any existing dangers — including a duty to maintain proper fences, signs, or barriers to prevent vehicles from being driven onto runways.

Airport operators who undertake to provide facilities for the direction of air traffic may incur liability through the negligent failure of those facilities to perform their function properly. One significant limitation applies: a state tort claim may not be maintained against a municipality for failing to maintain airport navigation facilities up to standard unless the plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed to meet FAA standards. The Federal Aviation Act vests authority over airport navigation facilities exclusively with the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA.

The common carrier utmost care standard does not apply to airport premises generally. Once a passenger exits the carrier's zone of control, ordinary premises liability rules apply to the condition of airport premises and equipment.

Air Traffic Controller Duty of Care

Air traffic controllers owe pilots a duty to exercise due care to avoid midair collisions regardless of weather and flight conditions. Hamilton v. United States (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2d 370. Because the pilot has final authority over the aircraft, the duty is concurrent — resting on both control tower personnel and the pilot in command. Neither ATC negligence nor pilot negligence operates in isolation; both can contribute to the same accident.

ATC's obligations extend beyond the tasks set out in FAA manuals. An air traffic controller must exercise ordinary care and give pilots all information and warnings specified in the controller's manuals. McDaniel v. United States. Under especially dangerous conditions, controllers must take steps beyond those set forth in the manuals if necessary to ensure the safety of pilots and passengers — the manual sets a floor, not a ceiling. Rudelson v. United States (9th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 1326 (holding controllers owed a duty to monitor a trainer aircraft's position while in the entry corridor, beyond what the manual required).

Claims against ATC personnel are claims against the United States and must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See below.

Federal Preemption and the Savings Clause

The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40103, grants the FAA authority over aviation safety and establishes a uniform federal safety regime. Because the FAA preempts the field of aviation safety, a state may not impose a common law duty that exceeds or conflicts with what the FARs require. Booth v. Santa Barbara Biplanes Tours, LLC (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1173 (applying the savings clause of 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c)).

The savings clause is what preserves California tort claims. Section 40120(c) expressly preserves state law remedies for personal injury and death arising from violations of federal aviation standards. What federal law preempts is the creation of state safety standards that exceed federal ones. What it does not preempt is a California tort cause of action for damages when a defendant violates those federal standards. The FAR establishes the standard of care; its violation establishes the breach; California tort law provides the cause of action and the remedy.

This principle extends to FAA Advisory Circulars. In Sierra Pacific Holdings, Inc. v. County of Ventura (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 509, the court held that an FAA Advisory Circular applicable only to federally funded projects does not preempt state tort law on the standard of care for obstructions near a runway protection zone where the project at issue was not federally funded. Advisory Circulars are not federal regulations and do not carry the same preemptive force as FARs.

In Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 1259 (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that the Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt state law personal injury claims arising from safety- or operations-related incidents including plane crashes. State law governs the claim and provides the remedy. Federal regulations set the standard of care.

FAR Violations as Negligence Per Se

Operation of an aircraft in violation of federal aviation statutes or regulations creates at least a rebuttable presumption of failure to exercise due care and can constitute negligence as a matter of law. Ebrite v. Crawford (1932) 215 Cal. 724; Steering Committee v. United States (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 572; Ayer v. Boyle (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 822. In Management Activities, Inc. v. United States (C.D. Cal. 1998) 21 F.Supp.2d 1157, the court held directly that violations of Federal Aviation Regulations constitute negligence as a matter of law. Because a safety regulation violation is likely to be a proximate cause of resulting injuries, the causation element often follows from the regulatory violation itself.

California Evidence Code section 669 codifies the negligence per se presumption: a person who violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity is presumed to have failed to exercise due care if the violation proximately caused injury, the injury resulted from an occurrence the statute was designed to prevent, and the injured person was within the class of persons the statute was designed to protect.

Federal Aviation Regulations commonly at issue in accident cases include:

• 14 CFR § 91.119 — Minimum safe altitudes. Requires pilots to maintain sufficient altitude to make an emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface; prohibits flight over congested areas below 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle and over non-congested areas below 500 feet above the surface except over open water or sparsely populated areas.
• 14 CFR § 91.103 — Preflight action. Requires the pilot in command, before beginning a flight, to familiarize himself or herself with all available information concerning that flight — weather reports, fuel requirements, alternatives if the planned flight cannot be completed, and runway lengths at airports of intended use.
• 14 CFR § 91.155 — Visual flight rules weather minimums. Establishes cloud clearance and visibility minimums below which VFR flight is prohibited.
• 14 CFR § 91.7 — Aircraft airworthiness. Prohibits operation of an aircraft that is not in an airworthy condition. The pilot in command must discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions arise.
• 14 CFR § 61.23 — Medical certificate requirements. A pilot who flies without the required medical certificate is in violation of this regulation.

Beyond the written FARs, pilots are required to know the Airman's Information Manual — an FAA publication covering basic flight information, air traffic control procedures, and general instructional information — and FAA Advisory Circulars pertaining to their flying activities. These documents are chargeable to all certificated pilots and are evidence of the standard of care among pilots. Management Activities, Inc. v. United States.

Res Ipsa Loquitur and Questions of Fact

California's general tort principles apply to aviation accident cases. This includes res ipsa loquitur — the doctrine that permits a jury to infer negligence from the accident itself when direct evidence of the cause is unavailable.

Three conditions must be satisfied: the accident must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; the accident must have been caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and the plaintiff must not have voluntarily contributed to the accident. A properly maintained aircraft that crashes under normal operating conditions is the type of event res ipsa is designed to address.

In Newing v. Cheatham (1975) 15 Cal.3d 351, the California Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict on liability in a wrongful death case arising from an airplane crash where all conditions for res ipsa had been met, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence, and the evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Res ipsa does not merely shift the burden of producing evidence — in the right case, it is the basis for a directed verdict.

Questions of negligence and contributory negligence are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury when different conclusions might reasonably be reached on the evidence. Johnson v. Western Air Exp. Corp. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 614. Whether an accident was caused by a pilot's negligent act or by an atmospheric condition beyond the pilot's control is for the jury. In a midair collision, which aircraft had the right-of-way is a question of fact. McMahon v. Maddox (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 119. Under the imminent peril rule, whether the course of conduct a party chose among several alternatives was the choice of a reasonable person under those circumstances is also a question of fact. Miller v. Contra Costa County (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 304. However, where expert testimony is uncontroverted and the circumstances do not permit reasonable doubt on the issue, a pilot can be found guilty of willful misconduct as a matter of law. Mittelman v. Seifert (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 51.

The Montreal Convention: International Flights

For injuries arising from international flights, the Montreal Convention — a multinational treaty ratified by the United States in November 2003 — is the exclusive legal framework. It completely preempts state law. There is no fallback to California negligence law if the Convention does not provide a remedy.

The Article 17(1) Accident Requirement

The Convention makes a carrier liable for death or bodily injury of a passenger only if the cause was an "accident" and only if that accident took place on board the aircraft or during embarking or disembarking. The United States Supreme Court defined "accident" in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985): an unusual or unexpected event that is external to the passenger and does not arise from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft. A flight proceeds normally and a passenger develops deep vein thrombosis — that is the ordinary operation of the aircraft and produces no "accident." A crew member ignores a known medical emergency — that inaction is an external event and qualifies. In Olympic Airways v. Hussain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), the Supreme Court confirmed that a carrier's failure to act — including failing to move a passenger away from a known hazard — constitutes an "accident" under the Convention.

Bodily Injury Requirement

Article 17(1) does not permit recovery for purely psychic injuries. A qualifying bodily injury is required. Emotional damages are recoverable under the Convention, but only to the extent they are traceable to the qualifying accident. Doe v. Etihad Airways (6th Cir. 2017) 870 F.3d 406.

Embarking and Disembarking

Whether an injury occurred "in the course of embarking or disembarking" is a fact-specific determination governed by a three-part test: the degree of control the airline exercised over the passenger at the time of injury; the activity the passenger was engaged in; and the passenger's location. A passenger who has passed through the gate and is moving under the airline's direction toward the aircraft is within the Convention's protection. A passenger who has cleared the terminal and is operating independently is not.

Two-Tier Liability Structure

Below the Special Drawing Rights threshold established by Article 21 — currently 128,821 SDRs (verify current USD conversion at IMF SDR valuation at time of claim) — the carrier is strictly liable for a qualifying Article 17 accident. No fault is required below this threshold. Above it, the carrier can defeat liability only by proving either that the damage was not due to its own negligence or wrongful act, or that the damage was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act of a third party.

Article 20: Exoneration by Passenger Fault

A carrier can reduce or eliminate its liability entirely if it proves that the passenger's own negligence or wrongful act contributed to or caused the damage. Comparative fault applies under the Convention.

Article 33: Where Suit Can Be Filed

The Convention limits the jurisdictions in which a plaintiff may sue a carrier to five: (1) the carrier's domicile; (2) the carrier's principal place of business; (3) the place where the ticket was purchased; (4) the place of destination; or (5) the passenger's principal and permanent residence at the time of the accident, provided the carrier has a physical presence in that jurisdiction — not merely a website, but actual operations. The fifth jurisdiction is the primary basis for a California-based plaintiff to sue a foreign carrier in the United States. "Principal and permanent residence" means the one fixed and permanent abode of the passenger at the time of the accident.

The Two-Year Deadline Is a Statute of Repose

The Convention's two-year filing period is not a statute of limitations — it is a statute of repose. It is not subject to tolling under any theory, including late discovery of facts. The period runs from the date of the aircraft's arrival at the destination, the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or the date on which carriage stopped. A carrier may invoke this period to bar claims filed after the deadline. Courts have consistently held it is not subject to tolling — but whether the Convention applies to a specific claim, and whether the period has run on the particular facts, requires individual analysis. Contact Attorney Michael Rehm to assess the timeline in your case.

Forum Non Conveniens

Even when a California plaintiff properly establishes jurisdiction under the fifth jurisdiction, the case may be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds if a foreign court is a more appropriate forum. In In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, MDL No. 10-2144-CRB (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) — the Air France 447 litigation — the Northern District of California dismissed multiple cases on forum non conveniens grounds, finding France the superior forum based on the nationality of the victims, the location of physical evidence and the official investigation, and the carrier's home country interest. For California plaintiffs on international flights involving foreign carriers, forum non conveniens is a live procedural risk that needs to be assessed at intake.

GARA: The 18-Year Statute of Repose for General Aviation Manufacturers

The General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note, imposes an 18-year statute of repose on product liability claims against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and component parts. Once 18 years have elapsed since delivery of the aircraft or part, product liability claims against the manufacturer are barred — regardless of when the plaintiff was injured or when the defect was discovered.

What GARA covers. "General aviation aircraft" means an aircraft that had fewer than 20 seats at the time of FAA type certification and was not in scheduled passenger service at the time of the accident. Commercial airliners are not subject to GARA's repose period.

The 18 years runs with the part, not just the airframe. The repose period attaches to individual components. A used part removed from one aircraft and installed on another carries the delivery date of its first installation to its original purchaser — not the installation date. In United States Aviation Underwriters Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp. (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 1092, the Ninth Circuit held that the limitation period for a used component part is permanently tied to that part's original delivery date. An aircraft that is only 10 years old can contain components that are 30 years old, and product liability claims against those components' manufacturers may be barred even though the airframe itself is within the 18-year window.

The four exceptions. The repose period does not bar a claim if: (1) the manufacturer knowingly misrepresented or concealed information material to the FAA certification that caused the accident — Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1073; (2) the injured person was a passenger receiving emergency medical treatment on board; (3) the injured person was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; or (4) the claim arises under a written warranty. The concealment exception is the most frequently litigated. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 681.

What GARA does not cover. GARA's repose period applies to manufacturers and parts suppliers. It does not apply to claims against pilots, aircraft owners, maintenance facilities, or flight schools. A maintenance facility that performed defective repair work, an aircraft owner who permitted an unqualified pilot to fly, or a flight school that negligently trained a student all face exposure under standard California negligence law regardless of the aircraft's age.

The Federal Tort Claims Act: Government Pilot and ATC Liability

When FAA air traffic controllers contribute to an aviation accident, the claim against the government must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States has accepted liability under the FTCA for injuries resulting from the negligence of government-employed pilots — United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener (9th Cir. 1964) 335 F.2d 379 — and from the negligence of air traffic controllers — Rudelson v. United States (9th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 1326.

The FTCA requires that an administrative claim be filed with the FAA — not with a court — before a lawsuit can be filed. The administrative claim must be filed within two years of the date the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Missing this administrative deadline can potentially bar the lawsuit. If FAA air traffic control failure is even a possible cause of an accident, the FTCA administrative timeline is the first issue to address — contact Attorney Michael Rehm to assess the specific timeline in your case.

California public entities — including the State of California and its political subdivisions — face liability under Government Code section 815.2 for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of employment, if the act or omission would have given rise to a cause of action against that employee. This covers state-operated aviation facilities and personnel.

California Insurance Requirements for Commercial Air Operators

Regardless of FAA certificate category, California law imposes its own insurance mandate on commercial air operators. Public Utilities Code section 5503(a) requires any commercial air operator — defined by section 5500 as any person owning, controlling, operating, renting, or managing aircraft for any commercial purpose for compensation — to maintain at least $1 million of liability insurance covering personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage, plus an additional $100,000 of coverage for each passenger carried.

The definition of "commercial air operator" is broad. A flight conducted for compensation — including charter flights, air ambulance operations, flight instruction, and aircraft rental — falls within section 5500. A Part 91 flight operated for compensation is a commercial operation under California law even if it does not require an FAA operating certificate beyond a private pilot's certificate.

The Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act, Public Utilities Code sections 24230 through 24410, creates a parallel post-accident regime. When a person is killed or injured, or when property damage above the statutory threshold is caused by an aircraft accident, the aircraft operator must file an accident report with the California Department of Transportation. The Department determines the security amount sufficient to satisfy a potential judgment and orders deposit of that security within 30 days — a mechanism designed to protect claimants against operators who might otherwise dissipate assets before judgment.

Strict Liability: Aircraft Landing on Property

California applies strict liability — without any requirement to prove negligence — where damage is caused by an aircraft landing on the property of another. This is a distinct theory from products liability under GARA and does not require any showing of pilot error or mechanical defect. A property owner whose land or structures are damaged by an aircraft landing is entitled to recover under this theory.

Admiralty Jurisdiction

Admiralty jurisdiction can arise in aviation crash cases where the aircraft was fulfilling a role that, but for air travel, would have been accomplished by a vessel. In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, California, 145 F.Supp.2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001). This issue does not arise in accidents at or near California's inland airports. It becomes relevant for crashes off the California coast or over navigable waters.

Damages in Domestic Aviation Cases

Aviation accidents routinely produce catastrophic injuries — traumatic brain injury, spinal cord injury, severe burns, and death. The damages framework under California Civil Code section 3333 covers the full scope of compensable losses in domestic cases.

Economic damages include past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, impaired earning capacity, and property damage. Future medical expenses must be proven with reasonable certainty under Civil Code section 3283 and are discounted to present value at trial.

Noneconomic damages — pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium — are not capped in domestic aviation accident cases. California's MICRA cap applies only to medical malpractice and has no application here. Under Proposition 51, codified at Civil Code section 1431.2, noneconomic damages are allocated on a several-only basis among multiple defendants — each defendant pays only its proportionate share of noneconomic damages but remains jointly and severally liable for economic damages.

Punitive damages are available under Civil Code section 3294 when a defendant's conduct constitutes malice, oppression, or fraud proven by clear and convincing evidence. Falsified maintenance records, knowingly flying an unairworthy aircraft, or disregarding known mechanical defects while carrying passengers can support punitive damage claims. Government entities are immune from punitive damages under Government Code section 818; that immunity does not extend to private defendants.

Wrongful Death and Survival Actions

Fatal aviation accidents bring both a wrongful death action and a survival action. Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 governs wrongful death standing — the surviving spouse or domestic partner, children, and those who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession may bring a wrongful death claim. CCP section 377.30 governs the survival action, brought by the estate, which recovers damages the decedent could have recovered had they survived.

For deaths occurring January 1, 2022 through January 1, 2026, CCP section 377.34 — as amended by SB 447 — permits recovery of pre-death pain, suffering, and disfigurement in survival actions. That window is closed for deaths occurring on or after January 1, 2026.

The statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death in domestic cases is two years from the date of injury. CCP section 335.1. For FTCA claims, the administrative filing deadline is also two years from accrual and runs independently. For international flight claims where the Montreal Convention governs, a carrier may invoke the two-year repose period to bar claims filed after that deadline; courts have consistently held it is not subject to tolling.

For domestic crashes — which includes all crashes at or near California's inland airports — the Death on the High Seas Act (46 U.S.C. § 30301) does not apply. DOHSA governs deaths occurring on the high seas more than 12 nautical miles from shore.

About Attorney Michael Rehm

Attorney Michael Rehm is a Sacramento-based personal injury attorney who handles aviation accident cases throughout California. He is admitted to the State Bar of California (Bar No. 241999) and practices from Sacramento at 2121 Broadway, Unit 188860, Sacramento, CA 95818.

Aviation accident cases often involve concurrent state and federal law issues, multiple defendants across different jurisdictions, and hard filing deadlines — the FTCA's two-year administrative claim cutoff, the Montreal Convention's two-year repose period — that differ from standard California civil filing rules. Identifying the correct legal framework and the correct deadlines at intake is the first job in every aviation case.

California Aviation Accident Cases: By City and Airport

The following pages address aviation accident cases in specific California markets, covering each region's airport footprint, local accident data, and the legal frameworks specific to that region's operations.

• Sacramento Aviation Accident Attorney — Sacramento International (SMF), Sacramento Executive (KSAC), Mather Airport (KMHR), and McClellan Airport (KMCC).

Attorney Michael Rehm represents aviation accident victims throughout California on a contingency fee basis. No fee without a recovery. Call (800) 978-0754 to arrange a free consultation.

The information on this page is general legal information, not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case turns on its own facts. The law can change — statutes are amended, cases are decided, and regulations are revised; nothing on this page should be relied upon as a statement of current law without verification. Deadlines and legal bars discussed on this page are general guides — whether a particular deadline applies, has run, or is subject to tolling, and whether a particular doctrine bars or limits recovery in your case, requires individual analysis. Contact Attorney Michael Rehm to discuss the specific facts of your situation.